persuade Contributing States' to establish the legal and administrative frameworks necessary to prosecute and punish their troops for crimes committed outside their territorial borders. A convention based regime specifically tailored to ensuring that peacekeepers are held accountable to internationally agreed standards would be the most effective way of enabling the UN to comply with the rule of law standards it itself espouses 2 and to retain legitimacy internationally and in the eyes of the communities where missions are deployed. In addition the UN should expand its Office of Internal Oversight Services (which already provides assistance in investigations through its Investigations Division) to encompass a dedicated fully resourced criminal justice unit tasked with monitoring the progress of cases; assisting in criminal investigations and evidence preparation; setting and monitoring due process and rise directly to criminal accountability of individuals. In situations of armed conflict IHL may be lex specialis. 22 Serious violations of IHL may give rise to criminal prosecutions of individual soldiers and may be subject to universal jurisdiction. Although members of a UN force are agents of the United Nations (UN) and take on the obligations of that organisation, the IHL obligations of Troop Contributing States continue to apply to its forces when serving as members of a UN operation, at least to the extent that those obligations have been incorporated into its domestic law. 23 However, formally IHL is only applicable to peacekeepers when they become parties to an armed conflict. Since prima facie peacekeepers are not parties to an armed conflict, IHL cannot, as a general base rule, be the lex specialis governing peacekeepers' operations. Determining when IHL is applicable to peacekeepers is especially difficult today because mandates are complex and generally contain some provisions under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter that allow for potentially robust use of force on a fluid basis to match the circumstances. This contrasts with earlier peacekeeping missions where transition to 'enforcement' action (which in most cases would trigger the applicability of IHL) was viewed as one-way street from which a return to traditional peacekeeping (to which IHL would no longer apply) was considered unlikely. This transition was sometimes described as "crossing the Rubicon" from peacekeeping to enforcement, after which it was expected that "military force would default to the use of war-fighting techniques' for the remaining duration of the mission." 24 Outside of armed conflict situations there are no international laws by which mission personnel deployed abroad maybe held personally accountable, and prosecuted, for individual 21 The ICRC notes that "[m]ost human rights treaties specify that they are to be applied by States parties wherever they have jurisdiction. However, it should be noted that treaty bodies, and significant State practice, have interpreted this as meaning wherever State organs have effective control." J. ; Sassoli and Olsen note that sometimes IHRL may be lex specialis since " [p] recision requires that the norm explicitly addressing a problem prevails over the one that addresses it implicitly, the one providing the advantage of detail prevails over the other's generality, and the more restrictive norm over the one covering the entire problem but in a less exacting manner.'" M Sassoli and L Olsen 'The relationship between international humanitarian and human rights law where it matters: admissible killing and internment of fighters in non-international armed conflicts. ' 
The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Peacekeeping Missions

Introduction
Most State armed forces are trained in IHL. IHL principles, in conjunction with the mission's rules of engagement (ROE), shape the way that commanders and their troops approach their duties in armed conflict situations, whether the force is party to the conflict or not. IHL brings international individual criminal responsibility and a duty to prosecute or extradite under the Geneva Conventions, and arguably also under international criminal law. However because the formal application of IHL to peacekeeping missions is so fraught with difficulties IHL is not a solution to the accountability gap in relation to peacekeepers.
The Bulletin on Observance by United Nations forces of humanitarian law
In most situations the criteria for determining whether IHL is applicable to peacekeepers will depend on whether the peacekeepers have become engaged as combatants in an armed This does not greatly help in resolving the problem of peacekeeper impunity (the primary concern behind the adoption of the Bulletin) but it does attempt to clarify the legal framework that applies to UN forces that become engaged as combatants in an armed conflict.
Unfortunately there are numerous practical problems that make applying the Bulletin difficult, many of which were widely discussed in the literature soon after it was promulgated. In particular it was argued that the threshold of "active engagement" as combatants is difficult to determine in practice and that The 'international law of armed conflict' refers to the general body of IHL governing both international and non-international armed conflict. The 'law of international armed conflict' refers to the specific branch of IHL governing international armed conflict. 54 During the negotiations for the Safety Convention a proposal was put forward that the Safety Convention would not apply would apply 'whenever military personnel of the UN operations were engaged in combat with organised armed forces having an identifiable command structure, carrying arms openly and controlling part of the territory of the host State' but it was rejected: UN inapplicable) on the basis that "the forces of the participating members states are carrying out an international mission on the basis of the United Nations resolution" and it "would be a denial of the clear international dimension of such missions if humanitarian law were to be restricted to common article 3 or to Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.
"58 However the ICRC's current view, and that of the majority of academic commentators, is that formally the law of international armed conflict applies only to conflicts between the armed forces of
States. 59 Consistent with this view peacekeepers engaged as combatants against non-State armed groups would be viewed as engagement in a non-international armed conflict, notwithstanding the international dimension of the UN operation. 60 This hardening of views may be due in part to the increase, post 9/11, in stability operations in which international forces may be mandated to work alongside Host State armed forces against rebel and insurgent groups.
At what point, if any, do peacekeepers regain protected status?
Once peacekeepers become actively engaged as combatants IHL is applicable 'to the extent and for the duration' of their engagement. Does the phrase "to the extent and for the However, as Orla Engdahl has observed in comments on the Safety Convention: a 'UN operation may be conducted over several years and it is possible that the situation on the ground could change considerably in character;' hence the failure to deal with the question of whether UN forces can return to protected status is problematic. 63 Peacekeeping doctrine evolved significantly during the 1990s. Early peacekeeping doctrine "suggested distinct boundaries between phases" of a peace support operation "and tended to create the impression that forces could be deployed under a mandate for a particular period, prepared and equipped to deal solely with the demands of a particular task such as peacekeeping." However by the early twenty-first century peacekeeping doctrine had moved towards the view that "there are no distinct compartments for Peace Support Operations
[PSO] in the spectrum of tension'" and that:
Experience has shown that campaigns do not progress in a linear manner.
Campaign Authority, which defines a PSF's capacity to act, as well as the nature of the force required to uphold the mandate, varies fluidly with time and location. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.
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Thus the Bulletin appears to be introducing a temporal element into the concept of combatant status that traditionally has been reserved only for civilians actively participating in hostilities. This creates problems for commanders in the field: if transition to combatant status is not one way only, how is a legal advisor (lacking the ability to foresee the future and thus the ability to know whether or not there may be a resumption of hostilities and if so on what scale) to determine the point at which peacekeepers' return to civilian protected status? ; Zwanenburg notes that it 'is unlikely that the opponent of a UN operation will accept the intermittent application of international humanitarian law.' M Zwanenburg, 'United Nations and International Humanitarian Law, (n 18), paragraph 19; An arguable case could be made that since combatant status does not properly exist in non-international armed conflict (other than for the purposes of distinction in the conduct of hostilities) resort to IHL (at least that part of it dealing with conduct of hostilities) in internal armed conflicts should be limited to the areas in which hostilities are taking place and law enforcement rules applied in those areas of the country that are stable and peaceful; but the approach taken in Tadic is widely accepted.
Ordinary civilians that have lost protected status regain it immediately that they have ceased engaging in the "specific hostile act" that rendered them participants in the hostilities.
In the view of the ICRC 'the "revolving door" of civilian protection is an integral part of IHL, not a malfunction. It prevents attacks on civilians who do not at the time present a military threat.' 68 However whilst a "revolving door" approach to the applicability of IHL to UN forces might provide a means of ensuring compliance with IHL targeting rules in situations where peacekeepers must engage in combat, whilst remaining constrained by ordinary selfdefence and law enforcement norms when the situation is less volatile, it would not be an effective means of holding peacekeepers accountable for crimes such as murder, torture, and inhumane treatment. The Bulletin was adopted to deal with the latter problem.
Ordinary civilians that directly participate in hostilities temporarily lose protected status; but they do not become combatants unless they take up a continuous combat role direct part in hostilities," using criteria that are purely activity-based. 70 There is no guidance of an equivalent nature, anywhere, on interpreting the meaning of "the extent and duration" of UN forces' "engagement as combatants:" it appears to be premised on a blurring of activity-based and status-based criteria that renders the basis of the transition, and hence the point at which it occurs, inherently opaque and thus open to differences of opinion. What ultimately distinguishes a war crime from a purely domestic offence is that a war crime is shaped by or dependent upon the environment -the armed conflict -in which it is committed. It need not have been planned or supported by some form of policy. The armed conflict need not have been causal to the commission of the crime, but the existence of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a substantial part in the perpetrator's ability to commit it, his decision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was committed.
Commission of War Crimes by Civilians
73
The ICTR cited the above paragraph with approval, but added that this does not mean that every act facilitated by an armed conflict situation constitutes a war crime. deployed, usually with a robust mandate to use force in specified circumstances.
Peacekeepers' relationship with the local population, and their power over individuals within it, is not the result an incidental consequence of the chaos of war but of purposeful deployment by the Security Council in response to the conflict. Thus in most cases, the existence of the armed conflict would "have played a substantial part" in the peacekeeper's ability to commit the crime, his decision to commit it and the manner in which it was committed, in a way that is different in nature to that of a civilian merely exploiting the break-down of order. Such a relationship, even if it were to be grossly abused, would not necessarily render IHL "applicable" in the sense of rendering the force a party to the conflict subject to the full range of obligations and privileges of IHL; but it may well be enough to establish a sufficient nexus to the conflict to render violence and abuse of civilians a war crime. In these circumstances peacekeepers could be held accountable under IHL for conduct amounting to a war crime regardless of whether the peacekeeping force is party to the conflict in the formal sense.
However not all abusive treatment of civilians would necessarily qualify as a war crime. Moreover in practice, it is unlikely that peacekeepers would be prosecuted for war crimes outside their home State, unless their conduct is so heinous as to attract the attention of the International Criminal Court. 
Applying the Principles and Spirit of IHL in Non-Armed Conflict Situations
The Bulletin implies that if, as a matter of fact, a peacekeeping mission engages in robust use of force where this is necessary to carry a mandated task, IHL may become applicable as a matter of law provided a certain threshold level of violence is reached. What that level is may not be crystal clear but it would seem quite reasonable, given the way in which the Bulletin is framed, for the commander to assume that he or she does not have to worry too much about that: so long as the force complies with the principles and rules of IHL, and with the mission's ROE, determining the exact point at which the threshold was crossed can be left to lawyers should there ever be a court case. Such an approach accords with the framing of the spirit," and subsequently "principles and rules" of IHL, regardless of whether IHL was formally applicable to them.
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The expectation that non-combatant peacekeepers should comply with the principles, spirit, and rules of IHL, whether or not they are parties to an armed conflict, has not to date been regarded as an especially radical stance, presumably because it has generally been assumed that if peacekeepers were to use robust force it would be in the context of an armed conflict and would be against a party to the conflict, and thus their role would be different from but, in key respects, analogous to a party to a conflict. Today that cannot always be assumed. Missions may be deployed to situations of lawlessness and armed violence that do not, or no longer, meet the criteria for armed conflict, and they may remain for many years. of an extradite or prosecute regime underpinned by a treaty" as a compromise measure less broad than the universal jurisdiction regime applicable to piracy, war crimes and crimes against humanity "in the sense of any State being able to assert jurisdiction irrespective of the location of the offender or the crime or the nationality of the persons involved;" but broad enough to require a State on whose territory an alleged offender is found to "refer the case to its competent authorities for the purposes of prosecution under its domestic laws" or to "extradite him or her to the State of nationality or to another State that has established jurisdiction." 91 A preliminary draft of the proposed Convention was published implementing this compromise; 92 but little progress has been made towards moving it beyond draft stage due to an inability amongst the delegates to agree workable grounds for moving forward.
Article 3 of the draft convention sets out the list of crimes to which it would be applicable. These include murder, wilfully causing serious injury to body or health, rape and sexual violence, and sexual offences involving children. Under an alternative version of would not be tolerated, as well as assist those States that might need an international convention to effect necessary changes at the domestic level.
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In 2012 the delegate for the EU stated that the EU and its Member States support "the dual track approach, combining short-term measures and long-term measures to deal with existing jurisdictional gaps." The delegate went on to say that the EU acknowledges:
the value of discussions regarding principles for an international legal instrument. We stand ready to consider a comprehensive legal framework within which alleged crimes could be investigated and prosecuted if necessary, thus enabling competent authorities to punish criminal conduct. We encourage other delegations to do the same.
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At the same meeting the delegate for Canada, Australia and New Zeeland said that these
States also support a dual approach and suggested that "a convention could further strengthen the integrity of the UN system and further promote the highest standards of professionalism among UN personnel." despite all the rhetoric on the subject of criminal accountability, in practice impunity was assured all down the line. Host States were often bound by headquarters agreements and had no manoeuvring room; at best, they could refer suspects to the United Nations. Since the United Nations could not punish them, they were sent back to their countries of origin, which often did not want to publicly admit the misconduct of their nationals and were therefore reluctant to prosecute them.
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He went to give an example, stating that only five months earlier: 
Summary of the Progress of the Sixth Committee in dealing with this issue
The Ad Hoc Committee is deeply divided over the way to approach the issue. Hence over the last seven years it has made very little progress. This is due in large part to the fact that although a number of States are willing to consider a convention, and a few are keen to do so (and would like it to apply to military personnel also), several major powers, including the Civil provosts would be assigned to field missions answerable only to the CJAC. In an effort to introduce checks and balances vis a vis the administrative apparatus of the Secretariat, the CJAC should be answerable to the General Assembly rather than the Secretary-General.
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The provost would be the principal operational point of contact with the Host State's criminal justice system for the purposes of implementing the collaborative justice system. The provost would be responsible for deciding whether the facts of a case warranted a full forensic investigation, and would also decide whether to repatriate, or to prosecute in partnership with the Host State. The provost would be subject to a rigorous system of accountability and the CJAC would have the power to remove a provost who is not performing to the highest standards of competence, integrity and impartiality. 
Feasibility of the Scheme
The Stimson Group's proposal is complex and would be expensive but has the merit of including a form of complementarity, in addition to direct UN involvement in ensuring the accountability of its personnel. The scheme is thought out in considerable detail and has received input from leading experts in the field, some of whom have extensive experience as government lawyers of major powers. Nevertheless significant challenges remain. The UN already has in place a Due Diligence policy that applies to all UN entities record on compliance with relevant international human rights norms, whatever the nature of the intended peacekeeping operation; and also that of Contributing States.
Assessment of the
The difference in treatment of civilian and military personnel
The difference in treatment of civilian and military personnel presents a more intractable problem. The justification given for the limitation of the applicability of the scheme to civilian personnel is that military personnel are subject to the military justice of their home If the UN is take a much more active role in criminal investigations and prosecutions with a provost appointed to field missions it will need to be able to exercise this role consistently. The appointment of a provost to a major field mission cannot depend on whether or not an MoU has been agreed with each Contributing State, and the provost's role within the mission cannot be different for different personnel depending on the terms of their State's MoU. Thus some aspects of the scheme would probably have to be established by the Security Council through a binding resolution; and certain aspects of SOFAs and MoUs applicable to UN peacekeeping missions would have to be framed as non-negotiable. The feasibility of the scheme would be increased if States were to agree at least a baseline scheme in the form of a multi-lateral treaty so that some core principles are agreed ahead of time.
Conclusion to Section 4
The Sixth Committee has been engaged for at least seven years on improving accountability of UN personnel; with limited success. An outline Convention limited to civilian personnel has been proposed but negotiations have stalled due to intractable disagreements between
States as to the best approach to take. The Stimson Group has proposed a scheme, also limited to civilians, that in addition to measures intended to counter impunity also takes into account the human rights obligations of the UN towards its own personnel. The scheme has merit but problems with regard to the difference in treatment between military and civilian personnel, and the ad hoc nature of UN agreement with Contributing and Host States, would need to be resolved.
Overall Conclusion
The current ad hoc approach to dealing with crimes committed by peacekeepers is no longer In order to tackle the current levels of impunity the UN must increase its criminal justice support capacity and must take a much more active role in criminal investigations and prosecutions of its personnel, in collaboration with the Host State and possibly also the Contributing State. If a Contributing State has a reputation for treating certain types of crimes with impunity, the UN would be failing in its responsibilities if it were to repatriate an alleged perpetrator of such a crime (whether civilian or military) without reliable guarantees that an investigation and prosecution will be undertaken (if the evidence supports it) and that both the investigation and prosecution will meet UN standards. Some of these changes can be Review process. A sustained campaign is required.
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